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Abstract
In this paper we examine the legal framework which governs the management of  pregnancy remains in the
context of  reproductive loss; specifically pregnancies which reach an unwanted end prior to 24 weeks’
gestation. It is important to consider the role for law as it is clear that law has the capacity to shape the
nature of  the care that people receive and their experience of  bereavement at the time of  reproductive loss.
The unwanted end of  a desired pregnancy can have profound consequences for those who experience it. How
we respond to the needs of  these individuals will have important consequences not just for their well-being,
but it can also impact their future reproductive experiences. Furthermore, the original empirical research on
which this paper is based demonstrates how healthcare practice in this area is problematic in its inconsistency,
and in failures to account for the particular needs of  the person who has suffered an unwanted end to
pregnancy. Because appropriate healthcare is properly determined in this context by the perspective of  the
individual, we argue that healthcare professionals should, as a matter both of  good practice and of  law,
follow the individual’s lead when seeking to understand their needs. Accordingly, we advocate for the
importance of  all legal options for disposal of  pregnancy remains being discussed when a person who has
suffered reproductive loss wants that information and present practical measures that can be introduced to
ensure this happens.
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1 Introduction
The loss of  a pregnancy, either through miscarriage or stillbirth, affects many peopleeach year.1 In addition to this, each year pregnant people will end a much-wanted
pregnancy for many reasons, e.g. following a diagnosis of  fetal abnormality.2 The unwanted
end of  a desired pregnancy can have profound consequences for those who experience it.
How we respond to the needs of  these individuals will have important consequences not
just for their well-being, but it can also impact their future reproductive experiences.3 It is
now accepted that appropriate care at the time of  loss should be responsive not just to
clinical but also emotional needs.4 In particular, care that facilitates the ability to grieve, if
necessary, can reduce the need for longer-term follow-up psychological care and improve
future reproductive outcomes.5 As such, the care and support provided to affected people
and their families can help to mediate how they experience the loss and significantly impact
their on-going health and well-being, including future reproductive decision-making.
In this paper we examine the legal framework which governs the management of
pregnancy remains6 in the context of  reproductive loss; specifically pregnancies which
reach an unwanted end prior to 24 weeks’ gestation.7 We do not focus on stillbirth
because, as we will explain in more detail below, there is ambiguity about the status of
pregnancy remains after miscarriage which does not exist in stillbirth, and often pregnant
people are not aware of  the legally permissible options for disposal of  miscarried
pregnancy remains. The medico-legal framework that governs miscarriage and stillbirth
has not been the subject of  sustained academic critique, notwithstanding the burgeoning
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1     It is estimated 1 in 8 pregnancies end in miscarriage amongst those who know they are pregnant: NHS,
Overview: Miscarriage <www.nhs.uk/conditions/miscarriage/#how-common-are-miscarriages>. 
2     The most recent statistics show that 3314 abortions were performed under this ground: Department of
Health and Social Care, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017 Summary Information from the Abortion
Notification Forms Returned to the Chief  Medical Officers of  England and Wales (DHSC, 2018). 
3     See, for example: Dimitrios Siassakos, ‘All Bereaved Parents are Entitled to Good Care after Stillbirth: A
Mixed-methods Multicentre Study (INSIGHT)’ (2018) 125(2) BJOG: An International Journal of  Obstetrics
and Gynaecology 160–70; Sarah Cullen, Barbara Coughlan, Anne McMahon, Brenda Casey, Sheila Power and
Mary Brosnan, ‘Parents’ Experiences of  Clinical Care during Second Trimester Miscarriage’ (2018) 26 British
Journal of  Midwifery <www.magonlinelibrary.com/doi/abs/10.12968/bjom.2018.26.5.309>. 
4     The emotional and psychological impacts of  miscarriage have been identified as a priority area for future
research: see Matthew Prior et al, ‘Priorities for Research in Miscarriage: A Priority Setting Partnership
between People Affected by Miscarriage and Professionals following the James Lind Alliance Methodology’
(2017) 7(8) BMJ Open 1–8. There is evidence that miscarriage can have psychological and emotional impacts
and that these are often under-recognised: see Ingrid Lok et al, ‘Psychological Morbidity following
Miscarriage’ (2007) 21(2) Best Practice and Research Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology 229–47. 
5     Siassakos (n 3); NHS North Bristol NHS Trust, PARENTS Study
<www.nbt.nhs.uk/www.nbt.nhs.uk/WCHResearchPARENTS>; Aleena Wojcieszek, ‘Care in Subsequent
Pregnancies following Stillbirth: An International Survey of  Parents’ (2018) 125 BJOG 193–201.
6     Here we follow the language of  the HTA guidance. The Authority explains its use of  this term, and why it
doesn’t distinguish between fetal tissue and other products of  conception as follows: ‘Women define their
pregnancy according to their own circumstances, values, understanding and beliefs. The HTA and
professionals in the field consider that any attempt to categorise the pregnancy may result in health
professionals viewing the pregnancy differently from the woman involved. Furthermore, if  the mode of
disposal were to be linked to types of  pregnancy or pregnancy loss, some women may find themselves being
denied certain choices. Acting in response to the needs and wishes of  the women first and foremost helps
avoid such problems.’ <www.hta.gov.uk/faqs/disposal-pregnancy-remains-faqs>.
7     We adopt the categorisation of  reproductive loss provided by Sarah Earle, Pam Foley, Carol Komaromy and
Cathy Lloyd, ‘Conceptualizing Reproductive Loss: A Social Sciences Perspective’ (2008) 11(4) Human Fertility
259–62. However, we wish to emphasise that situations where an unwanted pregnancy is ended with the
consent of  the pregnant person can constitute a reproductive gain, for more on this see Erica Millar, Happy
Abortion: Our Bodies in an Era of  Choice (Zed Books 2017). 
social science literature.8 However, it is important to consider the role for law, as it is clear
that law has the capacity to shape the nature of  the care pregnant people receive and their
experience of  bereavement at the time of  reproductive loss. Our analysis draws from the
findings of  the Death Before Birth (DBB) project – on which the first author provided
research assistance and the second author was a co-investigator – in order to support the
arguments that we make.9
DBB was a socio-legal, linguistic study of  how people in England who have
experienced miscarriage, termination and stillbirth reach decisions concerning the
disposal of  the remains of  pregnancy, how their perceptions of  the law impact their
decision-making, and how they communicate their experiences and choices to those who
support them.10 The options for disposal are set out in key guidance documents:
cremation (shared or individual); burial (shared or individual); sensitive incineration
(incineration separate to other clinical waste); burial at home or at some other site subject
to certain limitations.11 The first stage of  the DBB project involved an examination of
hospital documentation to find out what options were being offered or discussed with
those who experience reproductive loss. The next stage of  the project involved semi-
structured interviews with a range of  stakeholders including bereavement care providers
in hospitals within NHS England; professionals in the funerary industry; those who
worked with relevant bereavement support organisations; and women who experienced
stillbirth, miscarriage, or termination following a diagnosis of  fetal anomaly. These
interviews bore out a key finding of  the DBB project: that those who experience
miscarriage are offered information about some (usually cremation), but not all of  the
legally permissible options for disposal.12 It was also clear that individuals who miscarried
outside of  the hospital setting were not always fully informed about what to expect or
how to manage the pregnancy remains they passed.
In order to remedy the gap in information disclosure, we argue that the test for
informed consent as laid out in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board provides a legal basis
for requiring that pregnant people be given information on all legally permissible options
for disposal.13 Legally, pregnancy remains prior to 24 weeks’ gestation are regarded as the
person’s tissue. Ensuring that the person has a choice in what is done with those remains
once they cease to be physically connected to them forms part of  their interest in their
own physical integrity which the law of  informed consent seeks to protect. In addition,
options for disposal may have important implications for the acceptability of  different
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8     See, for example, Linda Layne, Motherhood Lost: A Feminist Account of  Pregnancy Loss in America (Routledge 2003);
Sarah Earle, Carol Komaromy and Linda Layne (eds), Understanding Reproductive Loss: Perspectives on Life, Death,
and Fertility (Routledge 2016); Roseanne Cecil, The Anthropology of  Pregnancy Loss: Comparative Studies in
Miscarriage, Stillbirth, and Neonatal Death (Berg 1996).
9     Death Before Birth: Understanding, Informing and Supporting Choices made by People who have
Experienced Miscarriage, Termination and Stillbirth <https://deathbeforebirthproject.org> (ESRC, ES-
N008359–1).
10   Death Before Birth, ‘About the Project’ <https://deathbeforebirthproject.org/about>.
11   See: HTA, Guidance on the Disposal of  Pregnancy Remains following Pregnancy Loss or Termination (HTA 2015); Royal
College of  Nursing, Managing the Disposal of  Pregnancy Remains (RCN 2015); Institute of  Cemetery and
Crematorium Management, The Sensitive Disposal of  Fetal Remains: Policy and Guidance for Burial and Cremation
Authorities and Companies (ICCM 2015); Sands Stillbirth and Neonatal Death Charity, ‘Chapter 20. Funerals and
Sensitive Disposal’, Pregnancy Loss and the Death of  a Baby: Guidelines for Professionals (4th edn, Tantamount 2016)
323–53.
12   For a detailed summary of  the key findings, see: Sheelagh McGuinness and Karolina Kuberska, Report to the
Human Tissue Authority on Disposal of  Pregnancy Remains (less than 24 weeks’ gestational stage) (2017)
<https://deathbeforebirthproject.org/research/htareport2017>.
13   Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [108].
treatment options to the pregnant person. As such, disposal of  pregnancy remains should
be discussed as part of  the care and management of  miscarriage. 
The legal question in Montgomery related to risk disclosure when seeking informed
consent to medical treatment, and whether a doctor had breached her duty of  disclosure
by failing to warn a pregnant patient of  the risk of  shoulder dystocia occurring during
vaginal delivery, and the alternative option of  delivering the baby by way of  a caesarean
section instead. The Supreme Court concluded that the doctor’s duty was:
. . . to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of  any material risks
involved in any recommended treatment, and of  any reasonable alternative or
variant treatments. The test of  materiality is whether, in the circumstances of  the
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to
attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that
the particular patient would attach significance to it.14
Thus, information disclosure in healthcare goes beyond information about risk to include
variant or alternative treatments, and should be tailored to individuals.15 In adopting this
approach, the court endorsed the approach to consent set out in General Medical Council
(GMC) guidance which also focuses on the need to tailor information to individual
patients.16 In keeping with this, we argue in section 3 of  this paper that in accordance
with Human Tissue Authority (HTA) guidance, healthcare staff  should advise pregnant
people of  all disposal options, including those not available through the hospital, and
details of  whom to approach if  the person’s preferred method of  disposal is not offered
by the hospital.17
Prior to that legal argument, in section 2 we provide an overview of  the conceptual
framework that grounds our arguments. We endorse a feminist person-centred approach
to understanding pregnancy loss. The strength of  this approach is that it acknowledges
the range of  views that different people may have with regard to pregnancy remains. The
remainder of  the section details the practical implications which management of
pregnancy remains has for treatment for miscarriage. As we detail below, alternative
approaches to the management of  miscarriage will have consequences for the physical
experience of  miscarriage and may also impact the options for disposal available to the
pregnant person. As indicated, in section 3 we detail the legal basis for ensuring that
pregnant people are provided with appropriate information on disposal options. We argue
that disposal of  pregnancy remains should be discussed as part of  the explanation of
different options for the management of  miscarriage. Disposal options are part of  the
information necessary to ensuring that a pregnant person knows what to expect from
treatment and the relationship between treatment and disposal may influence the
acceptability of  different approaches to management of  miscarriage. The final part of
our paper makes some specific recommendations about the possibility of  using
standardised policies, consent forms and information leaflets to promote consistency in
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14   Ibid [87].
15   Ibid [87] and [90].
16   Ibid [93]. GMC, ‘Consent: Patients and Doctors making Decisions Together’ (GMC 2008) [4] <www.gmc-
uk.org/-/media/documents/consent---english-0617_pdf-48903482.pdf>. This guidance is in the process of
being revised post-Montgomery, but the current draft revised guidance still focuses on the need to tailor
information disclosure to the individual patient: GMC, ‘The Main Principles of  this Guidance’, Decision Making
and Consent: Supporting Patient Choices about Health and Care: Draft Guidance for Consultation (GMC, 2018) 6
<www.gmc-uk.org/-/media/ethical-guidance/related-pdf-items/consent-draft-guidance/consent-draft-
guidance.pdf>.
17   HTA (n 11) [9].
information provision and thus facilitate better care in this area. Clearly defined
information provision pathways will be extremely important. It is our intention in this
paper to identify practical solutions, with a clear foundation in law, which can improve
healthcare in this area.
2 Reproductive loss and remains of pregnancy
2.1. UNDERSTANDING PREGNANCY LOSS
Earle et al describe how ‘reproductive loss may not be experienced and understood in the
same way by different groups of  people’.18 The DBB Project findings echo this and
evidence heterogeneous attitudes towards the end of  a pregnancy, towards the remains,
and towards options for treatment and disposal. In order to accommodate this diverse
range of  views, we advocate a person-centred approach to understanding pregnancy and
reproductive loss.19 In particular we highlight the embodied nature of  reproductive
experience and detail the implications of  this for how we understand the relationship
between the pregnant person and the pregnancy remains and for the care and
management of  miscarriage. In the opening to Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’
Bodies, Rebecca Kukla states:
the fetus and with it the pregnant woman are not objects that come with ready-
made stable boundaries . . . the maternal body incarnates one human being at the
beginning of  pregnancy and two at the end of  it, and it is by no means clear how
to tell a coherent story about this passage.20
For those who experience reproductive loss, particularly prior to 24 weeks, this lack of
coherence continues, or indeed can be exacerbated, as once the pregnancy ends there are
not two. One of  the DBB project participants describes the situation as follows:
There’s only me that knew that I was ever pregnant. You know. There’s only me
that knows I ever had a baby well obviously my family knows but um there is
nothing to say that she existed okay she never made it into this world but she
existed.21
As such the fetus and subsequently the remains occupy a liminal category. Some parents
will perceive this material as their child and want it to be afforded all the respect, dignity
and ceremonial disposal as that of  a formerly living person.22 Others, perhaps most
obviously those ending an unwanted pregnancy, may not view the tissue in this way and
would not want ceremonial disposal.23
Isabel Karpin has influentially argued for the importance of  reconceptualising the
maternal–fetal relationship to counter-narratives that frame the pregnant person in
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18   Earle et al (n 7) 260
19   Layne (n 8); For an excellent recent contribution to this call, see Abigail McNiven, ‘(Re)collections: Engaging
Feminist Geography with Embodied and Relational Experiences of  Pregnancy Losses’ (PhD thesis, Durham
University 2014) <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10786>.
20   Rebecca Kukla, Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies (Rowman & Littlefield 2005) 4.
21   This was someone who had themselves experienced reproductive loss and now supported others in this
situation. WP3–05/2017. Some of  the quotations in this paper have been edited to ensure they are intelligible
to the reader. These edits have been minimal and have not impacted the substance of  the quotations.
22   Here we use ceremonial disposal to describe cremation or burial as often these are accompanied by a
ceremony with features similar to a truncated funeral. See further, Karolina Kuberska, ‘Unwitnessed
Ceremonies: Funeral Services for Pre-24-week Pregnancy Losses in England’ in S Kilshaw and K Borg (eds),
Negotiating Miscarriage: A Social, Medical and Conceptual Problem (Berghahn Books forthcoming).
23   Amanda J Myers, Patricia A Lohr and Naomi Pfeffer, ‘Disposal of  Fetal Tissue following Elective Abortion:
What Women Think’ (2014) Journal of  Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care 84–9.
opposition to the fetal subject.24 Using the frame of  ‘not one but not two’, she suggests
we recuperate the maternal–fetal connection:
. . . to place the woman in control of  her body/self  and the fetus and not, as she
was constructed in the pre-technological era, as subject to her body nor, as she
might otherwise be constructed in the age of  technology, as subject to the fetus.25 
We suggest that a similar recuperation of  the interest a person might have in their
pregnancy remains is important to meeting the needs of  those who have experienced
reproductive loss. Peel and Cain note:
It is hard to locate pregnancy loss in the lexicon of  feminism: Feminists have
been well taught to mistrust the concept of  the ‘pre-born’ child, the now
ubiquitous foetal image which threatens to take over the mother’s subjectivity
and agency.26
The lack of  opportunity to acknowledge the status of  the remains poses a challenge to
the pregnant person’s agency and subjectivity different to that traditionally identified in
the abortion debate; in this case the ‘strangeness’ that the remains are not recognised as
‘a child’. Linda Layne argues that:
It is time for feminists to move pregnancy loss from ‘a private space of  shame’
to a ‘public space of  solidarity . . . Feminists must frankly acknowledge the
frequency and import of  such events in women’s lives and create a woman-
centred discourse of  pregnancy loss.27
We agree and argue that such an approach provides a nuanced framework for how we
might understand the relationship between the person and the remains. Such an approach
is driven by the needs and interests of  the pregnant person rather than fear or suspicion
of  fetal personification. By placing the person in control of  defining the boundaries of
their interests in pregnancy remains it is possible to accommodate a range of  views and
experiences from those who view the material as their future child, to those who attach
no significance to it at all. 
In her study of  reproductive loss amongst white middle-class American women, Layne
highlights the way in which those who experience pregnancy loss often find themselves
caught between two contradictory cultural forces. First, is the power of  medical and
reproductive technologies which (i) make the fetus increasingly visible and public and (ii)
increase expectation of  a ‘successful’ reproductive outcome. Home use tests facilitate
people finding out they are pregnant before they have even missed a period. In addition to
this, medical and reproductive technologies have increasingly facilitated the entry of  the
fetus into ‘public life’ and mean that pregnant people get to ‘see’ their child at earlier
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24   See Isabel Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman’
(1992) 3(1) Columbia Journal of  Gender and Law 325–49.
25   Ibid 330.
26   Elizabeth Peel and Ruth Cain, ‘Chapter 6. “Silent” Miscarriage and Deafening Heteronormativity: A British
Experiential and Critical Feminist Account’ in Earle et al (eds) (n 8) 87 drawing on the work of  Petchesky. For a
discussion of  the relationship between the pregnancy loss movement and anti-abortion politics, see Layne (n 8).
27   Layne (n 8) 239.
gestational stages.28 Van der Sijpt describes the dominant linearity of  reproductive
narratives:
Current thinking and theorizing about pregnancy and childbirth often take a
linear time frame as a starting point. Dominant biomedical embryological
notions trace the development of  a fertilized ovum into an embryo and
eventually, a foetus that is believed to be viable at a specific gestational age.
Consequently, pregnancies are conceptualised as a gradual process evolving over
time and expressible in days, weeks, months and trimesters.29
Furthermore, there is the perception that a pregnancy, particularly one which is medically
managed, will progress along a trajectory that gives rise to a living child. Layne argues that
this combination of  ‘earlier and more intensive social construction of  fetal personhood’
and increasingly unrealistic expectations about the possibilities of  biomedicine can
exacerbate experiences of  reproductive loss.30 The Royal College of  Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists (RCOG) Green-top Guideline No 17 defines miscarriage ‘as the
spontaneous loss of  a pregnancy before the fetus reaches viability’, taken to be 24 weeks’
gestation.31 They provide the following statistics on occurrence of  miscarriage:
If  this happens in the first 3 months of  pregnancy, it is known as an early
miscarriage. Unfortunately, early miscarriages are common, with 10–20 in 100
(10–20%) pregnancies ending this way. Late miscarriages, after 3 months of
pregnancy but before 24 weeks, are less common: 1–2 in 100 (1–2%) pregnancies
end in a late miscarriage.32
Miscarriage, particularly early miscarriage, is therefore a relatively common experience.
Notwithstanding this, it is usually unplanned and unexpected. Discourses of  pregnancy
commonly focus on positive birth outcomes and future living children, often overlooking
potential negative experiences.33 As Peel and Cain summarise:
Pregnancy loss is an example of  the cultural silence around reproductive
‘malfunction’: statistically common it remains shrouded in secrecy.34
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28   The role of  ultrasound in pregnancy has been subject to sustained and varied critique, see for example,
Rosalind Petchesky, ‘Fetal Images: The Power of  Visual Culture in the Politics of  Reproduction’ (1987) 13(2)
Feminist Studies 263–92; Janelle Taylor, The Public Life of  the Fetal Sonogram: Technology, Consumption, and the
Politics of  Reproduction (Rutgers University Press 2008). For a succinct overview of  these arguments and a
fascinating account of  the role of  ultrasound in the context of  termination of  pregnancy, see Sian Beynon-
Jones, ‘Revisioning Ultrasound through Women’s Accounts of  Pre-abortion Care in England’ (2015) 29
Gender and Society 694–715. 
29   Erica Van der Sijpt, ‘Chapter 8. Focusing on Force and Forms in Cameroon: Reproductive Loss Reconsidered’
in Earle et al (eds) (n 8) 79. See also Erica van der Sijpt and Catrien Notermans, ‘Perils to Pregnancies: On
Social Sorrows and Strategies Surrounding Pregnancy Loss in Cameroon’ (2010) 24(3) Medical Anthropology
Quarterly 381–98.
30   Layne (n 8) 29.
31   Royal College of  Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, The Investigation and Treatment of  Couples with Recurrent First-
trimester and Second-trimester Miscarriage (Green Top Guideline No 17) (RCOG, 2011)
<www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/gtg_17.pdf>.
32   Royal College of  Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Information for You: Recurrent and Late Miscarriage: Tests and
Treatments of  Couples (RCOG 2012) <www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/patients/patient-
information-leaflets/pregnancy/pi-recurrent-and-late-miscarriage---tests-and-treatment-of-couples.pdf>.
33   For example, pregnancy support books rarely include information about reproductive loss, and if  they do it
is minimal and tends to focus on the risks of  early miscarriage. This is indicative of  a broader glossing over
of  positive negative outcomes to pregnancy: see, for example, in relation to pre-natal testing, Pam Lowe et al,
‘“Making it All Normal”: The Role of  the Internet in Problematic Pregnancy’ (2009) 19(10) Qualitative Health
Research 1476–84. 
34   Peel and Cain (n 26) 79.
This taboo leads to the second cultural force Layne identifies. The experience of
reproductive loss is often met with silence or by attempts to minimise the significance of
the experience.35 Samantha Murphy states ‘by creating this foetus, this unborn child as a
social being, we turn this woman into “its mother” – defining her in terms of  the
foetus’.36 Yet, in situations of  reproductive loss where there is no living child existing in
the world:
[T]he very people who have encouraged the mother-in-the-making to take on
this role and may have participated with her in the social construction of  her
‘baby’ often withdraw their support for these interrelated projects and act as if
nothing of  any significance took place.37
When reproductive loss is mediated through the cultural taboo surrounding it, the
experience can be made worse through lack of  recognition or acknowledgment of  what
the person has been through. For example, some of  the DBB project participants pointed
to lack of  acknowledgment of  reproductive loss from colleagues once they returned to
work.38
In addressing the cultural taboo surrounding reproductive loss we need to
acknowledge the complexity of  the relationship that people may have with their
pregnancy remains, as is clear from the following account from one of  the DBB project
participants:
Obviously mine was, um, so mine stopped growing at six weeks but I was twelve
to thirteen weeks pregnant cause my body hadn’t realised that nothing was
happening. Um so so he said your only options are a cremation and that has to
be on site erm and it’s up to it whether you want to be there or not and then if
you want but the remains to remain on site. And I was like right okay that makes
no sense bothering to uh. I just thought oh why wouldn’t it just go in with general
like clinical waste if  it’s – if  they’re not deeming it as a thing? So it sort of  made
no sense I was like is it a thing? Cause one minute it is a thing and the next it’s
not a thing?39
This quotation emphasises the importance of  information provision being context-
specific and sensitive to the needs of  the individual. For this woman, the fetus did not
constitute a baby at this point, but rather, ‘a thing’. The offer of  a cremation diverges with
this perception and elevates the status of  the remains in a way which does not accord with
her perception. We are thus sensitive to the fact that the way in which options for disposal
are offered can have implicit meaning for the status of  pregnancy remains: by placing a
particular value on the remains, we may be transforming the pregnant person into a role
or a relationship they do not yet identify with.40 As this quote emphasises, we must also
be careful of  imposing narratives or scripts on grieving individuals by assuming that a
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35   Alice Lovell, ‘Some Questions of  Identity: Late Miscarriage, Stillbirth and Perinatal Loss’ (1983) 17(11) Social
Science and Medicine 755–61; Claudia Malacrida, ‘Complicating Mourning: The Social Economy of  Perinatal
Death’ (1999) 9 (4) Qualitative Health Research’ 504–19.
36   Samantha Murphy, ‘Chapter 9. Bereaved Parents: A Contradiction in Terms?’ in Earle et al (eds) (n 8) 118.
37   Layne (n 8) 17.
38   This may be because people are unsure what to say. See Jeannette Littlemore et al, ‘Pregnancy Loss: How to
Find the Right Words to Talk about it’ (The Conversation, 25 August 15 2018)
<https://theconversation.com/pregnancy-loss-how-to-find-the-right-words-to-talk-about-it-100915>.
39   WP4–10/2017.
40   For a similar, but sharper, account of  dissatisfaction in a similar situation see Leslie J Reagan, ‘From Hazard
to Blessing to Tragedy: Representations of  Miscarriage in Twentieth-Century America’ (2003) 29(2) Feminist
Studies 356–78.
much-wanted pregnancy means an automatic preference for ceremonial disposal.41 Nor
should we assume that because a someone has elected to have a termination they have no
interest in the remains.42 Instead, we argue that healthcare professionals should take the
lead from pregnant people about their needs. 
Montgomery, whose application to this area is explained below, endorsed a patient-
centred approach to information disclosure in healthcare.43 Consistent with that, our
critical reasoning here, and the findings from the DBB Project, we advocate for the
imperative of  a person-centred approach to care in the area of  disposal of  pregnancy
remains; one that acknowledges the heterogeneity of  views that individuals might have
about their pregnancy remains and the range of  feelings they may have about the status
of  those remains. In order to ensure that someone is prepared for what to expect from
the experience of  miscarriage, and also to allow them to make an informed choice about
different treatment options. We argue for the importance of  all options for disposal being
discussed unless, in response to the healthcare professional advising there are different
options available, the pregnant person indicates they do not want that information. We
will now detail the legal framework that sets the contours for the permissibility for the
management of  fetal remains.
2.2 MISCARRIAGE AND STILLBIRTH – DEFINITIONS, REGISTRATION AND DISPOSAL
Legally, pregnancy losses that occur prior to 24 weeks’ gestation are treated differently
from those that occur after this time. A pregnancy that ends before 24 weeks’ gestation
is a miscarriage; after this time it will be defined as a stillbirth and subject to different
rules regarding registration and burial.44 In England and Wales, the Births and Deaths
Registration Act 1953, s 41 (as amended by the Stillbirth (Definition) Act 1992, s 1(1))
defines stillbirth as ‘a child which has issued forth from its mother after the 24th week of
pregnancy and which did not at any time after being expelled from its mother breathe or
show any other signs of  life’. A stillbirth must be registered and, upon registration, the
parents will be issued with a certificate which permits burial or cremation.45 There is no
legal requirement to register a miscarriage and, while a very clear set of  legal rules
surrounds the disposal of  the body of  a baby born dead after 24 weeks, the law governing
the disposal of  remains prior to this gestational age is much less clear.46
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, prior to 24 weeks’ gestation the
remains are treated as the person’s tissue, or, in the language of  the Human Tissue Act
2004, ‘relevant material’.47 The HTA Code of  Practice summarises the situation as follows:
The law does not distinguish between fetal tissue and other tissue from the living;
fetal tissue of  less than 24 weeks gestation is considered to be the mother’s tissue,
as are non-fetal products of  conception (i.e. placenta, membranes, umbilical
cord, amniotic fluid). Consequently, fetal tissue and non-fetal products of
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44   NHS, ‘What Happens if  your Unborn Baby Dies: Stillbirth’ <www.nhs.uk/conditions/stillbirth/what-
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46   For a discussion of  this, see ‘Management of  Miscarriage: Your Options’
<www.miscarriageassociation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Management-of-miscarriage-
2016.pdf>. 
47   Human Tissue Act 2004, s 53.
conception are subject to the same consent requirements under the HT Act as all
other tissue from the living (see section on tissue from the living, paragraphs
108–112). However, because of  the sensitivity surrounding pregnancy loss,
consent should always be sought, even where it might not be lawfully required.48
Alluded to in this quotation is the fact that disposal of  relevant material does not
normally fall within the remit of  the HTA; rather the Authority has a statutory function
to regulate removal, storage, or use of  human tissue through a system of  licensing and
inspection. Thus, when an individual miscarries, the pregnancy remains are regarded as
their tissue. If  that tissue is to be stored or used for the purposes of  a histological or post
mortem examination to ascertain the cause of  the miscarriage, ‘appropriate consent’ must
be sought.49 Disposal of  human material is not subject to the same statutory rules as
removal, storage and use; most importantly for our purposes, specific consent is not
required for disposal. It is not our purpose in this paper to provide an argument for
specific consent to disposal. Instead we argue that in order to give fully informed consent
to management of  the miscarriage, pregnant people need to be informed about what to
expect during the experience of  miscarriage and how to manage the remains
subsequently, as part of  the discussion of  different management options.
As already noted, while the law makes no distinction between pregnancy remains and
other tissue, the HTA recognises that pregnancy remains are different as their nature is
‘particularly sensitive’.50 The Authority has therefore sought to address this sensitivity by
issuing specific guidance entitled ‘Guidance on the Disposal of  Pregnancy Remains
following Pregnancy Loss or Termination’.51 This sets out the disposal options which
should be offered, and requires that all those options be discussed.52 The guidance was
developed between 2014 and 2015 following a request from the Chief  Medical Officer.
Caroline Brown, then Head of  Regulation at the HTA, summarises the background to the
guidance as follows:
During 2014, miscarriage and the disposal of  fetal remains had been the subject
of  increased levels of  media controversy and public scrutiny: there had been
scandals regarding the disposal of  fetal ashes by crematoria in Scotland and the
disposal of  fetal remains by hospitals across the UK, followed by a call for a
change in the legal status of  fetal remains.
It was the Channel 4 Dispatches programme aired in March 2014 that exposed
the poor practices of  some hospitals, which were routinely disposing of  fetal
remains by incineration without any reference to the wishes of  the parents. A
ministerial statement stating that incineration was not an acceptable method of
disposal prompted the Chief  Medical Officer to ask the Human Tissue Authority
(HTA) to develop new national guidance and to consider how compliance with
it might be monitored.53
The problematic practice that Brown mentions was the use of  incineration as a method
of  disposal of  pregnancy remains in the absence of  parental consent. The documentary
led to headlines such as ‘Thousands of  Unborn Foetuses Incinerated to Heat UK
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48   HTA, A: Guiding Principles and the Fundamental Principle of  Consent: Code of  Practice (HTA 2017) [141]
<www.hta.gov.uk/sites/default/files/files/HTA%20Code%20A.pdf>.
49   Human Tissue Act 2004, s 1(1).
50   HTA guidance (n 11) [4].
51   Ibid.
52   Ibid [5], [8].
53   Caroline Browne, ‘Foreword’ in McGuinness and Kuberska (n 12).
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Hospitals’.54 In the subsequent fallout there was confusion between normal incineration
practices and the practice of  ‘sensitive incineration’; that is, incineration separate to other
clinical waste. Sensitive incineration was recommended at the time in the HTA Code of
Practice and in guidance issued by the Royal College of  Nurses.55 Brown states that one
of  the key debates was whether sensitive incineration should continue to be considered
an appropriate disposal option.56 Guidance issued in Scotland in 2012 had indicated that
incineration was no longer appropriate in that jurisdiction.57 Ultimately the HTA decided
that sensitive incineration would continue to be an acceptable disposal option. We suggest
that sensitive incineration does form an important choice for some people. Amanda
Myers et al undertook research with people who elected to have a termination and their
findings show that many in this situation, i.e. ending an unwanted pregnancy, would not
find ceremonial disposal acceptable.58 The DBB Project findings highlight that such an
option may also be important for those experiencing the loss of  a wanted pregnancy, as
illustrated in the quote above. 
Despite the guidance from the HTA emphasising that ‘the wishes of  the woman, and
her understanding of  the disposal options open to her, are of  paramount importance’,59
the DBB project found that many pregnant people are not given full information about the
disposal options available to them. In the same way that the HTA has turned to the
common law to address the validity of  what is ‘appropriate consent’ for the storage and
use of  pregnancy remains,60 we will argue in section 3 that consent and the test in
Montgomery can be used to provide a legal basis to ensure that people are given information
about all disposal options, in accordance with the HTA guidance. In order to make this
case we suggest that information about disposal and management of  pregnancy remains is
a necessary aspect of  information disclosure as part of  the informed consent to treatment
process. We will now explain the relationship between disposal and management of
pregnancy remains and variant treatments that form part of  miscarriage care.
2.3 TREATMENT FOR MISCARRIAGE
Guidance from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) notes that
with regard to variant treatment for miscarriage:
[T]here is a lack of  research into the effects of  these different approaches from
the woman’s perspective, in particular their psychological and emotional impact.
Miscarriage is distressing for most women, and the type of  management itself
might affect women’s need for counselling, with a resulting cost to the NHS.61
54   Adam Withnall, ‘Thousands of  Unborn Foetuses Incinerated to Heat UK Hospitals’ The Independent (London,
24 March 2014) <www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/thousands-of-unborn-
foetuses-incinerated-to-heat-uk-hospitals-9212863.html>. This is a headline which re-emerges from time to
time in relation to broader anti-abortion editorial agendas, see, for example: Sarah Knapton, ‘Aborted Babies
Incinerated to Heat UK Hospitals’ The Telegraph (London, 24 March 2014)
<www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2016/03/15/aborted-babies-incinerated-to-heat-uk-hospitals>.
55   Royal College of  Nursing, Managing the Disposal of  Pregnancy Remains (RCN 2007).
56   Browne, ‘Foreword’ in McGuinness and Kuberska (n 12).
57   ‘Disposal of  Pregnancy Loss up to and Including 23 Weeks and 6 Days Gestation’ (Scottish Government
2015) <www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/cmo/CMO(2015)07.pdf> 
58   Myers et al (n 23).
59   HTA guidance (n 11) [4].
60   See (n 48) [19] and [20].
61   NICE, ‘2. Research Recommendations. 2.4. Management of  Miscarriage’, Ectopic Pregnancy and Miscarriage:
Diagnosis and Initial Management (Clinical Guideline [CG154], NICE 2012)
<www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg154/chapter/2-Research-recommendations>.
Interviews conducted as part of  the DBB Project suggest the lack of  information and
variation in practice does have an impact on people’s experience of  pregnancy loss.62 This
lack of  clarity and choice can have long-term impacts on the grieving process as noted by
one participant:
[The lack of  choice] can complicate people’s grief  if  they found afterwards, you
know, ‘I would have liked to have done this thing that someone else has done but
I never had that choice.’63
When a miscarriage does occur, there are three main treatment options: natural or
expectant management; medical management; or surgical management. Natural or
expectant management does not involve medical intervention, instead letting ‘nature take
its course’.64 Medical management of  miscarriage involves administering misoprostol to
soften the cervix and thus speed up the process.65 Surgical management involves removal
of  the fetal and pregnancy-related tissue, either by manual vacuum aspiration under local
anaesthetic or in the operating theatre under general anaesthetic.66
NICE guidance recommends expectant management as the first-line management
strategy for 7–14 days from confirmation of  diagnosis of  miscarriage with some
exceptions, such as previous negative reproductive outcomes, or where there is a risk of
haemorrhage, or evidence of  infection.67 Medical management is recommended if
expectant management is not successful or where expectant management is not acceptable
to the pregnant person.68 Finally, it is recommended that surgical management should be
offered where clinically indicated, although there is no elaboration on what the clinical
indications might be.69 The RCOG information for patients states: ‘[t]he risk of  infection
is the same if  you choose medical or surgical treatment’.70 Given this explicit preference
for expectant management, it is clear that the majority of  people will experience the
physical process of  miscarriage outside of  a clinical setting. 
The NICE guidance does not consider disposal of  pregnancy remains as part of  the
treatment process. However, it does state that pregnant people should be appropriately
informed about what to expect during treatment, including expectant management.71 We
argue that if  it is important that people are informed about ‘what to expect’ this should
include being provided with information about what to expect with regard to pregnancy
remains and options for management of  these remains. 
Research undertaken by Abigail McNiven also evidences how the variation in physical
experiences can impact on a person’s perception of  the acceptability of  different forms
of  management of  miscarriage.72 McNiven details how ‘[u]ncertainty regarding the
distinction between “normal” and “worrying” experiences within miscarriage, including
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64   Royal College of  Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Information for You: Early Miscarriage (RCOG 2016) 3
<www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/patients/patient-information-leaflets/pregnancy/pi-early-
miscarriage.pdf>. 
65   NICE, ‘Recommendations. 1.5. Management of  Miscarriage’ (n 61).
66   Ibid.
67   Ibid.
68   Ibid emphasis added.
69   Ibid.
70   Royal College of  Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (n 64) 3.
71   NICE, ‘Recommendations. 1.5. Management of  Miscarriage’ (n 61).
72   McNiven (n 19) 63.
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both bleeding and pain, emerged in a number of  participants’ narratives’.73 Within the
DBB Project, we found similar evidence of  uncertainty, including uncertainty about what
to do with the remains, as detailed in this account from one of  the support workers whom
we interviewed:
I get quite a few calls about that: ‘how much blood should I be losing?’, ‘these
pains that I'm having, is that normal?’, ‘I've been getting these pains’ and I'll be
saying to them, ‘well, the pains you are getting are labour pains because your body
has got to go into labour for the cervix to open and for the baby to go away.’ So
the pains that you are experiencing can be really quite severe and they didn’t
realise they were gonna have these pains. They're told it’s like a period pain . . . –
it’s nothing like a period pain.74
Lack of  information was a common theme in these interviews, as was guilt or dissatisfaction
on the part of  the woman with the decisions she made in the absence of  full information
or preparedness. The lack of  information about the physical experience of  miscarriage can
be exacerbated by confusion as to what to do with the remains once passed. The following
quote from one of  the DBB Project participants starkly illustrates this:
And I didn’t know what to do. I didn’t know how to to cope with what was
happening. I was in pain. So it sounds awful but the baby ended up falling into
the toilet. And I couldn’t I couldn’t stay in the bathroom so I I went back into
the bedroom and my husband who who was in the bathroom with me the whole
time and helping me to pass the baby he he had a look at the baby and tried to
get it out of  the toilet so that we could do something with the body. Um, but he
came back in the bedroom a couple of  minutes later and just said the the baby
had sort’ve disintegrated. The body’d split apart and um there was nothing much
he could do about getting it out of  the toilet. 
[A]nd then we, we had a terribly awful practical talk about what did we do next
so we ended up flushing the toilet.75
This participant was deeply upset by the experience and deeply regretted that she was not
better prepared about what to expect, and also about the steps that would have preserved
her options for what to do with the remains. Clear and comprehensive information
provision about what the physical experience of  miscarriage entails, what to expect with
regard to the remains, and information on the legally permissible options for disposal are
therefore vital for ‘[i]mprovement in the diagnosis and management of  early pregnancy
loss . . . in order to reduce the incidence of  the associated psychological morbidity’.76
Similar findings are reflected in the work of  Myers et al who interviewed people
undergoing termination of  pregnancy about the options they would want for disposal of
pregnancy remains.77 The authors note managing the process at home, where disposal by
professionals was not an option, caused feelings of  anxiety for some people, whilst not
being problematic for others. Some of  the Trust documentation, examined as part of  the
DBB project, did not address options for those who miscarry at home. And for those that
did, the advice varied from being told to bring the remains to hospital for disposal to
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being advised to flush the remains down the toilet.78 One interviewee, a volunteer with a
support organisation, describes how the lack of  information and understanding about the
physicality of  the remains, and permissible disposal options, can lead to confusion and
feelings of  guilt about choices made:
Some mums will come and say oh I collected it in a in a Tupperware box or
whatever and then others will be really against like I didn't think I just flushed the
toilet I didn’t think there'd be anything and then they’ve got that guilt as well you
know that they just flushed it while somebody else has buried it and made made
a memorial you know and because they didn't know ‘cause they were never told
that there would be something and also some people get a phone call after an
ARPC and are told we've got the remains what do you want us to do with them
and they never knew there would be remains.79
In this section we have argued that the pregnant person has an interest in their pregnancy
remains, including an interest in how the remains are disposed of. In addition, we have
discussed the heterogeneity of  views that different people hold following loss of
pregnancy. Finally, we provided an overview of  the proximate relationship between
different treatment options for miscarriage and the embodied experience of  loss both in
terms of  pain and also in terms of  the management of  disposal of  pregnancy remains.
The acceptability of  different treatment options may be influenced by the physical
experience that attaches to each option, including what it means for the management of
pregnancy remains. In the next section we will explain how the law on informed consent
grounds the obligation to take seriously the person’s interests in disposal of  their
pregnancy remains, as part of  the process of  care and management of  miscarriage.
3 Montgomery: closing the information gap
Montgomery is now the leading case on the standard of  disclosure when seeking informed
consent to medical treatment.80 This paper does not explore the history of  the law
relating to informed consent leading up to this decision as that has been written about
extensively elsewhere.81 Instead, we focus on the ruling in Montgomery and how that can
be utilised to close the legislative gap around information provision on disposal options
for people experiencing miscarriage prior to 24 weeks.
As has been stated above, by the time of  the Supreme Court hearing in Montgomery,
the key question for the court concerned risk disclosure and the correct test for
determining whether or not a particular risk should have been disclosed to the patient.82
Mrs Montgomery had been under the care of  the defendant Health Board during her
pregnancy. Due to her small stature and diabetes, she was more likely to have a large baby,
which was associated with an increased risk of  shoulder dystocia occurring during vaginal
delivery. Shoulder dystocia involves the baby’s shoulders becoming stuck behind the
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pelvis during delivery. The medical evidence in Montgomery suggested that 70 per cent of
such cases are resolved without further complications but, where that is not the case,
there can be high perinatal mortality and morbidity and an increased risk of  maternal
morbidity.83 Despite Mrs Montgomery expressing concerns during her pregnancy about
her ability to deliver the baby vaginally, her treating doctor did not disclose the risk of
shoulder dystocia to her, or discuss the alternative option of  delivering the baby by way
of  caesarean section.84 Unfortunately for Mrs Montgomery and her child, shoulder
dystocia did occur during vaginal delivery causing the baby to suffer cerebral palsy
affecting all four limbs and a brachial plexy injury resulting in paralysis of  one arm.85
Mrs Montgomery asserted that she should have been told of  the risk of  shoulder dystocia
and the alternative method of  delivery by way of  caesarean section and, had this
occurred, she would have elected to undergo a caesarean section and her child would have
been born unharmed.86
At first instance and on appeal, the courts concluded that, applying Sidaway v Board of
Governors of  the Bethlem Royal Hospital87 which had taken the Bolam standard88 as the starting
point for determining the adequacy of  disclosure, there was no obligation for the risk of
shoulder dystocia and alternative method of  delivery by way of  caesarean section to be
discussed as other doctors would not have done so.89 The Supreme Court overturned
those decisions, rejecting the application of  Bolam as the standard for determining whether
information about medical treatment should be disclosed.90 Instead, the court held:
An adult person of  sound mind is entitled to decide which, if  any, of  the
available forms of  treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained
before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor
is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is
aware of  any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of  any
reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of  materiality is whether, in
the circumstances of  the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or
should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach
significance to it.91
The court also held that there were exceptions where doctors would not be held to this
standard. These were: (1) when information was withheld from a patient on the grounds
that the doctor reasonably believed its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the
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patient’s health (termed the ‘therapeutic exception’);92 (2) where treatment was necessary
(for example, treatment was required urgently and the patient was unconscious and so
unable to consent); and (3) if  the patient did not wish to be informed of  attendant risks
and alternative or variant treatments.93
The court went on to find that applying the correct standard, Mrs Montgomery
should have been advised of  the risk of  shoulder dystocia occurring and the alternative
method of  delivery by way of  caesarean section and, had she been given that information,
she would have elected to undergo a caesarean section and her child would have been
born uninjured.94
3.1 PROTECTING BODILY INTEGRITY: INTERESTS IN FETAL TISSUE
In Montgomery, Baroness Hale stated that the interest informed consent seeks to protect ‘is
a person’s interest in their own physical and psychiatric integrity, an important feature of
which is their autonomy, their freedom to decide what shall and shall not be done with
their body’.95 As has been noted above, the HTA guidance regards pregnancy remains
that result from a miscarriage as the person’s tissue.96 It is, therefore, part of  their body,
such that ensuring they have a choice in what is done with those remains once they cease
to be physically connected to them forms part of  their interest in their physical integrity,
which, as stated by Baroness Hale, the law of  informed consent seeks to protect. It is also
important to ensure that a pregnant person is fully informed about what to expect from
the experience of  miscarriage and to minimise confusion and upset regarding what can
be done with the pregnancy remains. As we have detailed, people respond to pregnancy
loss differently and thus healthcare professionals, when considering what information to
offer about disposal, should take their lead from the person experiencing the miscarriage.
This requires healthcare professionals to advise that there are different methods of
disposal available and then asking if  the person would like information about these. This
is consistent with the emphasis in Montgomery on patients having a right not to know, as
well as the right to have information if  they want it. It is also consistent with Montgomery’s
focus on tailoring information provision to the needs of  the individual patient in order to
ensure the right to decide what is done to your own body is protected.97
3.2 TAILORING INFORMATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL
Whilst Montgomery was primarily concerned with the question of  risk disclosure, it also
addressed the wider question of  what information patients should be given and the extent
to which that should be driven by the needs of  the individual patient. That information
should be tailored to the individual is suggested not only by the reference to risks the
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to in the test for materiality, but
also by the reference to the need to discuss the individual patient’s condition and the
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alternative treatments available in light of  that.98 It is given further support by the court
noting that in endorsing this standard, it was reflecting ‘a broadly similar approach’99 to
that taken in the guidance issued by the GMC. The guidance in question sets out the
standards expected of  doctors in the context of  seeking informed consent to medical
treatment and had long required doctors to ‘tailor’ information provision according to the
patient’s ‘individual circumstances’.100 We have explained the importance of  tailoring
discussions around the management of  miscarriage and options for disposal to the
individual patient in keeping with the HTA guidance.
The court also said that the obligation to disclose information is not dependent upon
the patient asking questions. If  it is information a patient could be expected to need to
know, it should be disclosed whether they have asked for it or not, unless one of  the
exceptions identified above applies, such as the person indicating they do not want
information about a particular disposal option.101 Therefore, those Trusts identified in
the DBB project which make disclosure contingent upon women asking questions about
particular disposal options102 are in breach of  Montgomery’s explicit rejection of  this
requirement.
In tailoring discussions to the individual, the court in Montgomery said that doctors
should engage in dialogue with patients in order to ensure they understand what
treatment is proposed and alternatives.103 Thus, disclosure of  disposal options should not
be a ‘tick-box process’ but a two-way discussion between the patient and the healthcare
professional aimed at identifying what information the pregnant person wants and
ensuring that, where they do want information about disposal options, they are informed
of  all options, including those not available at the hospital but available elsewhere.
Otherwise, disclosure of  disposal options may negatively impact a person’s experience, as
is illustrated by the following quote from one of  the participants in the Myers et al study:
From an emotional side, I wouldn’t like to hear the options, because it would
make things really difficult . . .104
The information should also be provided in a sensitive way that is responsive to the needs
of  the person at the time. One of  the DBB Project participants highlighted how, although
patient was provided with information, it was not in a manner which was helpful at that
time:
Interviewer: Can I ask if  you got any leaflets?
Interviewee: Errm. We did in the EPU. Errm Just about what missed missed
miscarriage is. She did start saying about what happens with the remains. And I
ran out and threw up in the toilet because it was just it was so clinical the way she
talked about it. And what happens. They asked what what happens afterwards
once they’ve done the DNC. Do we want to keep them or what they do with
them? It made me feel physically sick and I ran out and I threw up in the toilet.105
It could be argued that these quotes give rise to the possibility of  non-disclosure as part
of  the therapeutic exception, i.e. healthcare professionals may consider disclosure of
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disposal options would cause significant harm.106 However, although the exact threshold
for significant harm has not been explicitly defined, it is accepted that it must go beyond
anxiety or distress; specifically, in Montgomery the court said it must not be used to ‘prevent
the patient from making an informed choice’.107 The quotation above illustrates distress
as a response to the way in which information provision was provided, and had the
healthcare professionals established what the woman wanted to know and addressed
matters sensitively, those reactions may not have occurred.
Tailoring information to individuals not only acts to protect a person’s interest in their
bodily integrity, it is also reflective of  good healthcare practice in the management of
miscarriage. Baroness Hale was clear in Montgomery that the law protects both physical and
psychiatric integrity.108 Whilst Montgomery concerned the appropriate standard of
disclosure in cases involving informed consent to medical treatment, it also has a wider
application to healthcare.
3.3 MONTGOMERY AND ITS WIDER APPLICATION TO HEALTHCARE
In Montgomery, the court noted that, whilst the judgment was primarily concerned with
doctors, as ‘a wider range of  healthcare professionals now provide treatment and advice
. . . it is also relevant, mutatis mutandis, to other healthcare providers’.109 We suggest that
the reference to the need to protect physical and psychiatric integrity, as well as its broader
application to healthcare providers, supports the notion that the need for information
provision is not confined to the provision of  medical treatment but extends to all of  a
patient’s healthcare needs where those needs have the potential to impact their physical
and psychiatric integrity. As spelled out above, the NICE guidance requires all options for
the management of  miscarriage to be discussed with the pregnant person in order for
them to decide how to proceed. NICE does not include discussion of  the disposal of
pregnancy remains within that and, on the face of  it then, disposal of  pregnancy remains
is not part of  the medical treatment of  miscarriage. What amounts to ‘medical treatment’
is contested and can vary between contexts.110 These debates are outside the scope of
this paper,111 but we argued in section 2 that disposal of  pregnancy remains should be
considered as part of  the discussion of  different treatment options. The choice of
approach to management of  miscarriage can impact the disposal options available with
consequential effects on the person’s psychological health. Therefore, disposal of
pregnancy remains forms part of  the person’s wider healthcare needs in the management
of  miscarriage.
Furthermore, case law post-Montgomery lends support to the argument that the
requirement of  informed consent to medical treatment set out in Montgomery encompasses
events which, even if  not regarded as part of  the treatment itself, arise as a consequence
of  that treatment. In Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust,112 nursing staff  failed to
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advise a patient on discharge of  the risk of  developing post-operative deep vein
thrombosis or pulmonary embolism. Collender HHJ found in favour of  the patient,
concluding that the need to disclose this information fell within the scope of  Montgomery
and commenting ‘that the basic principles – and resulting duty of  care – defined in
Montgomery are likely to be applied to all aspects of  the provision of  advice given to
patients by medical and nursing staff ’.113 Therefore, in addition to our argument that
disposal of  pregnancy remains forms part of  healthcare in the management of
miscarriage, its proximity to such treatment justifies our conclusion that the need to
disclose information about disposal options falls within the scope of  the test for
informed consent as clarified in Montgomery. 
3.4 THE BENEFIT OF APPLYING MONTGOMERY
When setting out the correct standard of  disclosure that applied in the context of
informed consent, the court in Montgomery noted this reflected the standard set out in
medical professional guidance but felt imposition of  the standard at law was necessary to
ensure compliance.114 The DBB project findings illustrate that, despite the HTA guidance
being explicit that all disposal options should be discussed with people who miscarry, the
extent to which this occurs in practice varies.115 However, with regard to ‘storage and use’
of  pregnancy remains for the purposes of  further clinical examination, e.g. histology,
findings suggest that people were provided with very detailed information, not just on
how slides would be prepared for the purposed of  examination but also about how they
would be disposed of  subsequently.116 As such it is clear that this is an area where legal
obligations can help achieve consistency in practice between healthcare settings and
professionals.
That the HTA guidance should be the starting point for determining what the
common law requires is supported by O’Hare v Coutts.117 In this case, when considering
the application of  Montgomery in the context of  financial advice, Kerr J said that a
professional regulatory regime should be treated as strong evidence of  what the common
law requires.118 The HTA guidance then is evidence that the common law should require
disclosure of  all disposal options in order to protect the patient’s physical and psychiatric
integrity as part of  good healthcare, and Montgomery provides the legal basis for this. The
following section explores how the argument we make in this paper can be translated into
practice.
4 Facilitating better care in the context of reproductive loss
4.1 AN INTEGRATED CARE PATHWAY
If, as we have argued, consent and the test laid out in Montgomery provide a legal basis for
the need to disclose information about all options for the disposal of  pregnancy remains
following miscarriage, then standardised policies, forms and information could be
encompassed within a miscarriage care pathway. Pregnancy loss can occur within
different departments, for example, A&E, Gynaecology, Early Pregnancy Assessment
Units etc. In order to ensure comprehensive care, we argue for one policy to cover
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disposal of  pregnancy remains across hospital departments as part of  an integrated care
pathway.119 The need for such a pathway is stark, given the inconsistent nature of
provision of  treatment for miscarriage, which is summarised as follows:
[T]he care of  those experiencing miscarriage has developed in the UK in a much
more patchy manner, despite the development of  national guidelines; this type
of  reproductive loss has no obvious specialty to call home within the current
National Health Service (NHS) structures, and can be housed in a range of
organizational locations. Even limiting consideration to secondary care, people
experiencing miscarriage might be cared for within a dedicated early pregnancy
unit, a maternity or gynaecology ward.120
This patchiness, borne out in the DBB Project findings, shows different experiences of
care depending on the clinical environment where the miscarriage took place. The use of
standardised forms could help to overcome this patchiness by providing reliable resources
that are easily accessible to health practitioners in a number of  contexts. These resources
will need to be supported by appropriate training. A standardised document on disposal
options could be integrated into a miscarriage care pathway and could encompass those
experiencing pregnancy loss at home, as well as those experiencing pregnancy loss within
a hospital setting. 
Sands (the Stillbirth and Neonatal Death charity) has led a coalition of  organisations
to develop a National Bereavement Care Pathway with a view to ensuring bereaved
parents are all offered ‘equal, high quality, individualized, safe and sensitive care’.121 This
was developed in conjunction with the Department of  Health and several other baby loss
charities and medical professional bodies.122 Miscarriage care forms part of  this national
pathway and if  comprehensively adopted will hopefully lead to improved care for all
those who experience reproductive loss. 
4.2 STANDARDISED FORMS
In Scotland, guidance issued by the Chief  Medical Officer and Chief  Nursing Officer on
disposal of  pregnancy remains of  less than 24 weeks’ gestation incorporates advice on
information to be included in drafting patient information leaflets, and sample wording
for a consent form.123 Although we disagree with the Scottish rejection of  sensitive
incineration as an acceptable disposal option, we suggest that a similar approach to
standardisation of  information provision could be taken in England. We are aware that
advocating for the use of  a standardised information document could be criticised as
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risking de-individualising care.124 For example, some research indicates that patients who
are asked to sign consent forms see such forms as protecting the hospital from litigation,
rather than making their particular wishes known.125 Similarly, use of  standardised forms
is often criticised for failing to take account of  persons with poor literacy skills, or who
do not read or write English.126 Montgomery emphasises that the duty of  information
disclosure is not fulfilled by ‘bombarding the patient with technical information’.127
Instead, the healthcare professional’s ‘advisory role involves dialogue’.128 We argue here
for the use of  standardised forms to support active verbal discussion of  options for
management and disposal of  pregnancy remains, not as a substitute for such dialogue.
Recent research on consent conducted on behalf  of  the GMC suggests healthcare
professionals find standardised information useful to ensure that everything that should
be addressed is covered when seeking a patient’s consent.129 One interviewee in the DBB
Project, a volunteer with a support organisation, summarised how absence of
information can lead to confusion about what options are available, or a feeling that there
is a lack of  choice as to what they can do:
I’ve heard people say well what seems to be on offer is this kind of  group
cremation. They’ve said ‘I don’t know if  we’ve got the choice to do anything
different and maybe we’ll want to do something different.’ People don’t always
seem very clear on their options.130
Thus, standardised forms should not simply be distributed to those experiencing
pregnancy loss in fulfilment of  the obligation to discuss options for disposal of  the
pregnancy remains. Instead, they should be used to frame the dialogue between the
pregnant person and the healthcare professional, to ensure the person’s choices are
accurately recorded, and that the they can leave the hospital with the information that
they require. Standardised forms can provide a reliable resource that is easily accessible to
health practitioners in a number of  contexts. In accordance with HTA guidance, such
forms should inform healthcare staff  of  the need to advise patients of  all disposal
options, including those not available through the hospital, and details of  whom to
approach if  the person’s preferred method of  disposal is not offered by the hospital.131
The DBB project found that people’s perceptions of  time are sometimes skewed by
the experience of  miscarriage and that people needed to take time to reflect on their
decisions, rather than being rushed through the decision-making process.132 Therefore
people experiencing miscarriage should be given time to reflect upon their options for
disposal and discussion should happen in a quiet place, with the opportunity to ask
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questions, and to read the patient information leaflets.133 There may be practical issues
with provision of  such facilities; for example, finding a quiet place in a busy A&E
department. This could be explored through a pilot study of  the use of  such forms.
People should also be made aware of  what will happen in the event of  no decision being
made. Adopting this approach to standardised forms as part of  an integrated
bereavement care pathway can facilitate person-centred care in the context of
reproductive loss, utilising consent and the test laid out in Montgomery as the legal basis for
such an approach acts to respect physical and psychiatric integrity in the management of
miscarriage.
5 Conclusion
Reproductive loss is a relatively common experience and yet a cultural silence exists
around it, despite the recognition that such loss can have a profound impact on a person’s
psychological and physical well-being and future reproductive experiences. Appropriate
care at the time of  loss which responds to the person’s emotional and clinical needs, and
facilitates grieving, can reduce the need for long-term psychological care and improve
future reproductive outcomes.134 This paper provides a legal argument for the
importance of  ensuring that information about different options for disposal of
pregnancy remains should be discussed as part of  this care. NICE recognises that all
options for management of  miscarriage should be discussed. We argue that details of  the
options for disposal should form part of  this discussion as part of  the information
disclosure necessary to ensure informed consent to treatment. 
The empirical research on which this paper is based demonstrates how healthcare
practice in this area is problematic in its inconsistency and fails to account for the
particular needs of  the person who has suffered an unwanted end to pregnancy. Despite
the existence of  HTA guidance aimed at overcoming the legislative ambiguity around the
need to discuss disposal options with individuals who miscarry prior to 24 weeks, the
DBB project revealed that this guidance is not being consistently followed.
We recognise that people will view the pregnancy remains from miscarriage in
different ways according to their experience, attitudes and beliefs. Some may want
ceremonial disposal, whilst others will not. In recognition of  this, we have advocated for
a person-centred approach which recuperates the maternal–fetal relationship. Healthcare
professionals should follow the pregnant person’s lead in the management of  miscarriage
by providing information about all disposal options where they want this information. By
placing the pregnant person at the centre of  care, and facilitating their control over these
remains, healthcare professionals should, as a matter both of  good practice and of  law,
be responsive to needs of  the individual. 
We have advocated for the importance of  all legal options for disposal of  pregnancy
remains being discussed. Adopting the approach outlined in Montgomery, we have
suggested that a person’s bodily interest in their tissue should be protected by disclosure
and discussion of  all information options, unless they have explicitly stated they do not
want such information. Such discussions should be tailored to individuals in accordance
with Montgomery’s patient-centred approach and our person-centred approach, which
acknowledges that people have different embodied experiences of, and attitudes towards,
miscarriage. 
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Reproductive loss will usually be unexpected and unplanned for, and people in this
situation will need clear and accessible information about the options available to them.
The medico-legal framework that governs miscarriage and stillbirth has important
consequences for the care received by persons experiencing reproductive loss. As such, it
is important that this framework is subject to scrutiny and critique; and it is extremely
important that this critique acknowledges the embodied nature of  pregnancy. To date,
reproductive loss and disposal of  pregnancy remains has been an underexplored area of
legal scholarship, yet it is an area which is profoundly significant. Montgomery’s requirement
of  patient-centred care in the context of  informed consent to medical treatment should
be echoed in the management of  miscarriage and disposal of  pregnancy remains,
ensuring a person-centred approach to the care and management of  miscarriage.
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